A Case for Civil Marriage by Sanger, Carol
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2006 
A Case for Civil Marriage 
Carol Sanger 
Columbia Law School, csanger@law.columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Contracts Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Carol Sanger, A Case for Civil Marriage, CARDOZO LAW REVIEW, VOL. 27, P. 1311, 2006; COLUMBIA PUBLIC LAW 
RESEARCH PAPER NO. 06-133 (2006). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1442 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For 
more information, please contact cls2184@columbia.edu. 
Columbia Law School 
Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group 
 
 





A CASE FOR CIVIL MARRIAGE 
 






PROFESSOR CAROL SANGER 










This paper can be downloaded without charge from the 






A CASE FOR CIVIL MARRIAGE 
Carol Sanger* 
In Leonard Bernstein’s 1953 musical comedy Wonderful Town, 
there is a terrific song called One Hundred Easy Ways to Lose a Man.1  
The heroine, Ruth Sherwood, catalogues all the mistakes a girl can 
make in trying to get a man.  She might, for example, know more than 
he does about baseball or cars, or in the refrain I have in mind, she 
might know more than he does about grammar.  Worse yet, she might 
let him know she knows more than he does about baseball, cars, or 
grammar.  As Ruth laments, “Just show him where his grammar 
errs/And mark your towels ‘Hers’ and ‘Hers.’”2 
This was once simply a funny line.  But since 1953, and especially 
since 2003 which brought the Goodridge v. Department of Public 
Health3 and Lawrence v. Texas4 cases, the line has become much more.  
It is for some a charming aspiration—all couples can register for 
monogrammed towels!  For others, the possibility of same-sex marriage 
is a grim prediction of the legalization of moral decay. 
And in response, there has been a frenzy of legislative activity 
aimed at nailing down the legal definition of marriage to make sure that 
there will be no more nonsense about same-sex monograms or same-sex 
marriage applications.  In an effort to slow down the frenzy, and to 
encourage those within the academy to think harder about the on-going 
problem of what to do about marriage, Professor Edward Stein has 
posed a straightforward question: Should civil marriage simply be 
abolished?  In this mini-symposium, Professors Edward Zelinsky and 
Daniel Crane have provided two answers to his question: yes and yes. 
Let me explain the double positive.  Both authors agree that 
marriage should not, in Professor’s Zelinsky’s words, be “recognized, 
defined, or regulated by the state.”5  Both are content to use contract to 
 
 *  Barbara Aronstein Black Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.  I am grateful to Kari 
Hong for her insightful comments. 
 1 LEONARD BERNSTEIN & ROSALIND RUSSELL, ONE HUNDRED EASY WAYS TO LOSE A 
MAN (1953), available at http://www.leonardbernstein.com/studio/element2.asp?id=373 (last 
visited Dec. 22, 2005) (lyrics). 
 2 Id. 
 3 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 4 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 5 Edward A. Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage: The Pro-Marriage Case for Abolishing Civil 
Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161, 1164 (2006). 
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create enforceable marriage-like obligations.6  Yet their reasons for 
abolition differ in ways that distinguish their yeses.  Both agree that 
civil marriage should be abolished, but as we see from their paper titles, 
Professor Zelinsky wants to deregulate marriage7 and Professor Crane 
wants to privatize it.8  So while I am not going to turn into Ruth 
Sherwood and start correcting anyone’s grammar (everyone’s grammar 
was fine), I do want to look a bit harder at this comparative verb usage 
because the substitute regimes for the relationship formerly known as 
marriage are imagined differently under Zelinsky’s deregulation than 
under Crane’s privatization.  Deregulation will result in a market for 
marriage that will produce a multiplicity of contractual regimes from 
which couples may satisfy their most intimate consumer preferences.  
Professor Crane acknowledges a similar regime of choice but focuses 
on the historical case for one in particular, religious marriage. 
Although I am a Contract Law enthusiast, both arguments began to 
make me nervous about abolishing civil marriage.  I therefore want to 
explain why, after reading these intriguing papers, I have become an 
anti-abolitionist, or at least a contract skeptic.  I organize my remarks 
around two propositions.  The first is that Professor Zelinsky has more 
faith in the ability of contract law to organize intimate relationships than 
I do.  I will use his paper to talk about a few general problems of 
contracting for marriage.  Proposition number two is that Professor 
Crane has too little faith in law and I have too little faith in religion to 
justify returning marriage to an exclusively religious domain, however 
valid the historical support may be.  I will use Professor Crane’s paper 
to discuss the particular perils, of privatizing to religion, for women and 
same-sex couples. 
 
I.     DEREGULATING MARRIAGE 
 
Zelinsky offers several practical reasons why the state should get 
out of the marriage business.  He explains that marriage is no longer 
necessary for issues of parentage, custody, or adoption; it is not 
necessary for significant areas of wealth transmission, such as pensions 
or inheritance.9  Moreover, the benefits that are often associated with 
marriage—medical decision-making, evidentiary privilege, hospital 
 
 6 The idea was proposed forcefully by Martha Fineman a decade ago.  See MARTHA 
FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY 
TRAGEDIES 226-29 (1995). 
 7 See Zelinsky, supra note 5. 
 8 See Daniel A. Crane, A “Judeo-Christian” Argument for Privatizing Marriage, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1221 (2006). 
 9 See Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 1166-73. 
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visitation—are not as robust as most people think.10  In short, Zelinsky 
argues that, if civil marriage is abolished, the world will not look so 
very different than it does now.  It will certainly not look worse and, 
from a marital perspective, it may well look much better.  Active 
competition among firms will strengthen the institution.  People will 
feel more committed to domestic arrangements that they have 
affirmatively chosen.  The polity itself will be better off because there 
will be less squabbling over the meaning of marriage.  We can each be 
“married” in our own way. 
As a Contracts professor, I am honored that my subject has been 
chosen for this important assignment.  At the same time, I am wary 
about just how well it is going to perform.  As a way of taking seriously 
Zelinsky’s proposal for contract marriage, I want to explore several 
doctrinal concerns.  I begin with behavior that precedes the contract but 
upon which its validity may rest: disclosure.  At present, only non-
disclosures or misrepresentations that go to the heart of the marital 
relation justify annulment, or what we will now call rescission.  This list 
is small and includes such things as undisclosed impotency or venereal 
disease.11  In most cases, however, marital partners are more or less 
warranted “as is,” to use the commercial term and “puffing” is given a 
wide berth.12 
Under the new regime, full disclosure is required; each partner has 
an affirmative duty to provide all relevant information to the other.  
(Readers might pause to consider which of their beloved’s behavioral 
quirks they now realize had not been fully disclosed might have made a 
difference in their own decision to marry; I suspect the list is varied and 
interesting.)  Full disclosure changes the nature of the transaction that 
we used to call courtship.  And just what would full disclosure entail?  
Slovenly tendencies?  Insights about one’s constancy?  Under the 
contractual model, disclosures would no longer go to the essence of 
marriage—marriage has been abolished—but to the heart or essence of 
each particular transaction.  If one party is aware of a genetic 
predisposition to breast cancer or to Alzheimer’s disease, must this fact 
be revealed?  Certainly, the early death or impending incapacity of 
one’s partner and the implications for physical, emotional, and financial 
dependence and support is something a contracting partner might want 
 
 10 See id. at 1201-05. 
 11 HOMER CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 98-102 (2d 
ed. 1988). 
 12 Under the Uniform Commercial Code, “when the buyer before entering into the contract 
has examined the goods . . . as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods there is no 
implied warranty with regards to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances have 
revealed to him.”  U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b) (1998).  For application of the rule in the context of 
marriage, see Johnston v. Johnston, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 253, 254 (Ct. App. 1993) (annulment denied 
to wife whose messy, unemployed husband had “turned from a prince into a frog”). 
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to know about ahead of time.  Some couples may still choose to 
exchange “in sickness and in health” promises but others, perhaps on 
advice of prudent counsel, would not. 
There is also the familiar rule that contracting parties are bound by 
their agreements whether they have read them or not.  Prenuptial 
agreements, which will have to be called something else since there are 
no longer any nuptials, present an interesting category for application of 
the rule.  Especially with regard to first marriages, these agreements are 
often difficult for the happy couple to discuss, to negotiate, to 
scrutinize, and to sign.  It seems churlish to dicker over terms with one’s 
betrothed.  Nevertheless, in a somewhat spiteful 1993 case, Simeone v. 
Simeone,13 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the terms of a 
prenuptial agreement presented and signed on the eve of the wedding, 
as many are.14  The wife, an unemployed nurse who had married a 
surgeon, claimed that she hadn’t understood the meaning of alimony 
pendents lite.  The court rejected the argument wholesale, explaining 
that society has “advanced . . . to the point where there is . . . [no] 
viability in the presumption that women are uninformed, uneducated, 
and readily subjected to unfair advantage in marital agreements.”15  
Moreover, the court held that it would no longer specially scrutinize 
prenuptial agreements for fairness: “pre-nuptial agreements are 
contracts, and as such, should be evaluated under the same criteria as 
are applicable to other types of contracts.”  To interfere on the grounds 
of unfairness “would constitute a paternalistic and unwarranted 
interference with the parties’ freedom to enter contracts.” 
Not all states, however, have the same confidence in the ability of 
intimates to protect themselves adequately through bargain.  California 
legislation now provides that prenuptial provisions regarding spousal 
support are unenforceable unless “the party against whom enforcement 
is sought was represented by independent counsel.”16 
There is also the matter of default rules.  I agree with Professor 
Zelinsky that many couples, even those who are represented by lawyers, 
will contract incompletely and then turn to gap fillers provided by the 
state.17  It is interesting to think for a moment about why parties to a 
marriage contract may be especially unlikely to provide for the range of 
 
 13 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990). 
 14 Id.  The court also held that there was no duress: the timing may not have been ideal but 
the bride could have walked away from the deal.  From a straight contractual point of view, the 
court probably got this right.  As a matter of social interaction and reputation, canceling a 
wedding when the guests have already arrived may be another matter.  See Ariel Hart, Bride-to-be 
Admits Fleeing and Making Up Kidnap Story, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2005, at 1; see also Sharon 
Jayson, Real Runaway Brides are Rare But Inclination Isn’t, USA TODAY, May 3, 2005, at 9D.  
 15 Simeone, 581 A.2d at 165. 
 16 CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612 (c) (2004). 
 17 See Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 1165, 1182-83. 
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likely disputes.  As Lynn Baker and Robert Emery discovered in their 
study of newlyweds, there is an enormous optimism about marriage by 
those standing on its cusp.18  Although the study’s subjects were well 
aware of the general dismal statistics on divorce, not one of them 
thought that their own marriage would bust up.  In addition to the 
optimism bias, all the standard reasons that contracting parties leave 
things out apply: fear of introducing the deal breaker and a reluctance of 
parties in on-going relationships to spell out every expectation, demand, 
or obligation.19  For all these reasons, there is likely to be substantial 
recourse to gap fillers. 
I wonder, however, whether the default rules will begin to operate 
as a shadow regime, establishing baselines for marital obligation and 
support so that the law of marriage contract will over time not differ 
much from the law of civil marriage.  If, as Professor Zelinsky 
acknowledges, marriage contracts are a unique kind of contract and 
therefore “require . . . unique rules,” I would prefer to have the rules 
straight up rather than through indirect resort to contract.20 
My greater concern, however, is not about the terms parties leave 
out but about the enforcement of terms they explicitly include.  What is 
a court to do with provisions that limit the number of children to the 
marriage or that forbid the use of contraception by either spouse?  What 
about a contract that provides only fault-based grounds for dissolution 
or no grounds for divorce at all?  The immediate answer is that the 
complaining parties consented to the agreement and are stuck with their 
bargain.  But how will courts handle breach in cases where the wife has 
used a diaphragm or the husband has had an affair in violation of 
contract terms?  Should judges enforce liquidated damage clauses that 
deny the breaching spouse property?  Can a plaintiff sue for specific 
performance so that the defendant spouse might be enjoined from 
marrying again, just as defecting sports players cannot sign with other 
teams? 
There is also a deeper question about the contract-based marital 
regime.  Professor Zelinsky envisions an array of standard form 
contracts from which couples may choose.21  I am sure this will be so 
should his proposal prevail; we are energetic capitalists and just as 
umbrellas appear for sale on every Manhattan corner within two 
minutes of a thundershower, marriage entrepreneurs will be out there 
 
 18 Lynn Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship is Above Average: Perceptions 
and Expectations of Divorce at Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439 (1993). 
 19 For the argument that contractual promising is inadequate when applied to family 
relationships, see MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT 3 (2000)  (explaining 
that contract law “does not have the right concepts or languages to treat love, trust, faithfulness, 
and sympathy, which more than any other terms describe the essentials of family”). 
 20 Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 1198. 
 21 See id. at 1173-77, 1182-83. 
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faster than you can say “Party of the First Part.”  There will be contract 
options to cater to every relationship taste and preference.  But how 
customized can a marriage contract be before it falls outside the marital 
regime all together?  Is there a list of topics or terms that must be 
included before the arrangement is not marriage but something else, 
something perhaps closer to an employment contract or a property 
transfer or a friendship pact?  Must the contracting parties reside 
together or be economically interdependent?  Must there be provision 
for mutual support?  Other regulatory schemes that recognize alternative 
forms of intimate relationships assume and require a baseline of 
connection between the parties.  The province of Alberta, for example, 
provides for “adult interdependent partnerships” or “AIPS” to couples 
who are “emotionally committed to one another” and who “function as 
an economic and domestic unit.”22  The French Pacte Civil de Solidarité 
(the Civil Solidarity Pact or PACS) require parties to promise to provide 
“mutual and material support” to one another.23  Private ordering 
requires nothing of the kind.  Professor Zelinsky wants to retain the 
ceremonial aspects of marriage24 but I am no longer quite sure what the 
ceremony is for or what it will be celebrating. 
It may be that this question—what have we got here?—is no longer 
the state’s business.  If states get out of the marriage business, they 
would seem to have little room to object to whatever arrangements 
substitute in.  That, I think, is part of Professor Zelinsky’s goal.  
Marriage law has produced virulent debate over the meaning of the 
institution.  If marriage is deregulated, gay and lesbian couples can 
marry just like any other persons with contractual capacity.  Getting rid 
of civil marriage takes a contentious issue off the political table: there is 
no more state interest in private domestic arrangements other than 
policing the contracts by which the relationships are established. 
Putting aside the question of just who is going to fall for this as a 
political solution to disagreement over same-sex relationships, I am not 
sure that participants themselves want the state to step aside.  Civil 
marriage, as hokey and historically unjust as it has been, may still serve 
an important function even in its current disuse.  It offers a system of 
sanctioned commitment from which more inventive arrangements may 
veer but to which they seem to return for certain basics, such things as 
shared resources, support obligations, and a system for dividing children 
and property upon dissolution. 
 
 22 Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, 2002 S.A., ch. A-4.5 (Can.), available at 
http://www.qp.gov.ab.ca/documents/Acts/A04P5.cfm?frm_isbn=0779714903. 
 23 Law No. 99-944 of Nov. 15, 1999, J.O., Nov. 16, 1999, p.16959.  See generally Daniel 
Borrillo, The Pacte Civil de Solidarité in France: Midway Between Marriage and Cohabitation, 
in THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 475 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenaes eds., 2001). 
 24 See Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 1197. 
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Moreover, only civil marriage offers the means for parties to 
present themselves publicly as partners to the full extent permitted by 
law.  Civil marriage bestows status and respect precisely because it is 
created by law.25  I offer a contractual analogy.  As first year law 
students all learn, before the development of consideration, parties 
could make enforceable promises by promising under seal.  Now we are 
more advanced; we use the bargain principle to create enforceability and 
scoff at the seal as a silly formalism—the hot wax and all.  But the seal 
was not “just” a formalism.  It was a mechanism that signaled a 
person’s intent to be bound and to submit to sanctions if the promise 
was broken. 
Civil marriage may operate in somewhat the same way: it is a 
convention that signals an acceptance of certain obligations.  It does so 
publicly (often ceremonially) and as a matter of law.  I therefore 
disagree that marriage doesn’t matter because fewer people use it and 
some suffer no financial detriment in consequence.  Yes, those who 
knew what they are doing can still inherit; claim support; get the 
pension.  But they cannot do so with respect to their husband or wife.  
Contract law may work functionally (though I have expressed some 
doubts) but it cannot replace benefit of status: the respect of 
participating in civil marriage like everybody else. 
I fear that the preference for deregulation reflects something of an 
insider’s perspective.  Marriage may seem like very little when it can be 
declined, but it is much more significant when it is withheld.  Indeed, 
Professor Zelinsky has made a “blue state” case for deregulation.  We 
are too sophisticated for civil marriage; we don’t really need it; we 
know about the market.  But I see market behavior somewhat 
differently than Zelinsky.  Private firms would, I suspect, be unlikely to 
offer any partnership benefits in the absence of civil marriage.  For 
example, in 2005, the Montana Supreme Court held that if unmarried 
heterosexual couples could purchase health insurance from a state 
employer, unmarried same-sex couples must be offered the same 
benefit.26  Montana Blue Cross Blue Shield thereupon dropped all 
unmarried couples from coverage.27 
 
 25 Indeed, status has been defined as “a special condition of a continuous and institutional 
nature . . . conferred by law . . . whenever a person occupies a position of which the creation, 
continuance or relinquishment and the incidents thereof are a matter of sufficient social concern.”  
Marjoria Schultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CAL. L. 
REV. 204, 303 n.373 (1982) (quoting Manfred Rehbinder, Status, Contract, and the Welfare State, 
23 STAN. L. REV. 941 (1971)) (emphasis added). 
 26 Snetsinger v. Mont. Univ. Sys., 104 P.3d 445 (Mont. 2005). 
 27 Donci Bardash, BC/BS Decision on Non-married Partners Was Unfortunate, HELENA 
INDEP. REC., Sept. 21, 2005, available at http://www.helenair.com/articles/2005/09/22/opinions/ 
hjjejahihihfei.txt. 
  
1318 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 27:3 
II.     PRIVATIZING MARRIAGE 
 
Professor Crane has presented a theological case for the 
privatization of marriage.  He argues that Christianity and Judaism are 
making a big mistake by joining current political efforts to define 
marriage, for in so doing they are “implicitly acknowledging and 
confirming the state’s right to dictate the definition and contours of 
marriage.”28  The strategy may produce an immediate short-term 
benefit—securing marriage as the union of one man and one woman as 
a matter of law—but the gain is off-set by the more profound and 
encompassing loss of religious authority over marriage to the state.  In 
short, Professor Crane supports abolition so that marriage can return to 
its religious origins and flourish anew.  It is then a very distinct form of 
privatization that animates his argument. 
Like Professor Zelinsky, Professor Crane falls back on contract.  
Married couples agree to something like a choice-of-law clause.  Each 
religious tradition can offer and can “realize its own vision with respect 
to . . . marital obligation, divorce, and remarriage,” limited only by 
respect for “the minimal norms of a liberal democratic society.”29  
When disputes arise, the parties turn, for arbitrated resolution, to 
“tribunals specialized in the religious traditions of the relevant 
family.”30  I accept the accuracy of Professor Crane’s carefully qualified 
historical argument; I simply do not find it a persuasive reason to 
privatize civil marriage.  I argue first that marriage is already privatized 
within the Judeo-Christian tradition and second, that there are particular 
problems with privatizing religious marriage in a liberal democratic 
state. 
Professor Crane regards religious and secular laws as competing 
sources of marital regulation.  This is true to some extent: civil law 
permits divorce and remarriage; Catholicism does not; Massachusetts 
permits same-sex marriage; Methodists do not.31  But while there is 
some tension between the two regimes, coexistence works well much of 
the time.  Couples marry at law and in church.  Indeed, the state is fairly 
cooperative in this regard and delegates to clergy the authority to 
formalize the marriage ceremonially: “By the power invested in me by 
the state, I now pronounce you . . . ,” and so on. 
Shared authority over marriage acknowledges that marriage has 
 
 28 Crane, supra note 8, at 1222. 
 29 Id. at 1252. 
 30 Crane explains that arbitral judgments would be set aside only if they suffered from the 
sorts of deficiencies recognized generally under the Federal Arbitration Act, such as fraud.  Id. at 
1251 n.151. 
 31 Neela Banerjee, Top Methodist Court Backs Conservatives on Gay Issues, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 1, 2005, at A14. 
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several purposes—spiritual, economic, symbolic—and that different 
institutions may have superior competence to deal with one or another 
of them.  I suggest that most married folk—including people of faith 
and including C.S. Lewis—like it this way.  As Crane explains, Lewis 
married a divorced American, Joy Davidman, in a civil ceremony solely 
to help her secure legal residency in England.32  He did not consider 
himself really married to her until they participated in an ecclesiastical 
ceremony some time later: “For Lewis, civil marriage was unimportant 
and ecclesiastical marriage everything.”33 
But I think this is not quite the case.  Lewis may not have 
considered himself married before God until Ceremony Number Two, 
but he was quite willing to have the law consider him married to Joy 
Davidson after Ceremony Number One.  That was the very point of the 
first ceremony: to be married in the eyes of the law.  Many people hold 
their religious marriage most dear, yet I suspect that few would decline 
the benefits and the status that a marriage license secures.  In one sense 
then, marriage is already privatized.  Couples within the Judeo-
Christian tradition can already choose religious marriage and have it 
mean “everything.”  They may exchange and they may keep the vows 
made before God; the state permits but does not compel either marriage 
or divorce. 
I remind us about the present state of co-existence to highlight 
Professor Crane’s preference that between church and state, it is the 
state that should give way.  He assures us that nothing too bad can 
happen under this form of privatization because the religious regime 
cannot fall below the “minimal norms of liberal democratic society.”34  
That sounds good and upon first reading the phrase, all my liberal, 
feminist, upper west side fears were allayed.  Let the churches take back 
marriage; the minimum norms of a liberal democratic society will 
protect anything I might be worried about.  But the matter is not quite so 
simple. 
To begin, what are the minimum norms of a liberal democratic 
society?  The phrase is not a determinate one and has no technical 
meaning.  Because we are all law-trained, we can probably fill in a 
likely set of minimum norms without much trouble.  I suspect our list 
would include concerns about equality, participation, the rule of law, 
and perhaps respect for autonomy. 
But these are exactly the areas where religion lets us down.  In few 
religions do women and men participate equally with one another, 
whether as celebrants, members, and certainly as founders.  As political 
theorist Susan Okin has stressed, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, 
 
 32 See Crane, supra note 8, at 1242. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 1252. 
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certainly in their more orthodox forms, are organized around the 
authority of husbands and the subservience of women.35  Husbands 
control such things as the punishment of children and wives, the 
availability of divorce, and the distribution of property.36  This is not a 
feminist claim; it is a descriptive statement.  I am sure that most of us 
can uncontroversially come up with examples from within our own 
traditions. 
Participatory norms are also challenged by religious marriage.  Not 
all religions permit marriage outside the faith so that marriage to one’s 
chosen partner may not be permitted at all.  To demonstrate the value of 
civil law in such circumstances, political theorist Jeremy Waldron 
directs us to Romeo and Juliet, that most unhappily married couple.  
Prevented from marrying by the “traditions of the relevant family,” the 
star-crossed lovers had to leave their respective communities and 
decamp to Verona.  Waldron uses the case to illustrate the importance 
of an external “structure of rights that people can count on for 
organizing their lives, a structure which stands somewhat apart from 
communal or affective attachments and which can be relied on to 
survive as a basis for action no matter what happens to those 
attachments.”37  Civil marriage performs exactly this function: it 
provides a “basis on which individuals . . . can reconstitute their 
relations and take new initiatives in social life without having to count 
on the affective support of the communities to which they have hitherto 
belonged.”38 
Just as some religious traditions restrict entrance to marriage, not 
all faiths permit exit from the institution.  Restrictions on divorce 
implicate issues of autonomy and of equal participation, particularly for 
women.  As Okin has explained, women’s vulnerability within a 
marriage is intensified by their inability to leave it.39  The distribution of 
power at home impacts significantly on participation and influence in 
the public realm: “the more a culture requires or expects of women in 
the domestic sphere, the less opportunity they have of achieving 
equality with men in either sphere.”40 
 
 35 SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 7-13 (Joshua Cohen et 
al. eds., 1999). 
 36 Putting aside the substance of the rules, I am also not so sure that religious tribunals 
operate with complete respect for the rule of law, or perhaps I am too influenced by Sheila Rauch 
Kennedy’s book, Shattered Faith: A Woman’s Struggle to Stop the Catholic Church from 
Annulling Her Marriage. See SHEILA RAUCH KENNEDY, SHATTERED FAITH: A WOMAN’S 
STRUGGLE TO STOP THE CATHOLIC CHURCH FROM ANNULLING HER MARRIAGE (1997). 
 37 Jeremy Waldron, When Justice Replaces Affection: The Need for Rights, 11 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 625, 634 (1988). 
 38 Id. 
 39 SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, VULNERABILITY BY MARRIAGE IN JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE 
FAMILY (1989). 
 40 OKIN, supra note 35, at 13. 
  
2006] A CASE FOR CIVIL MARRIAGE  1321 
Consider one form of the restraint, the get.  This is the formal 
document husbands must give to wives in order for divorce and 
remarriage under Jewish law.  As Ayelet Shachar notes, this practice 
vests the ultimate power to decide whether or not to dissolve a marriage 
in the husband alone.  When the rule is sanctioned by state-authorized 
rabbinical courts, as in Israel, the consequence is something close to a 
“carte blanche license to subordinate certain members of the group.”41 
What then does a liberal democracy have to say about the get?  
Church elders in a polygamous settlement in Colorado City, Arizona, 
order a wife to leave her husband and become the plural wife of 
someone else.42  She agrees because her faith compels her to though she 
would prefer to stay married to her chosen husband.  What does a 
liberal democracy have to say about this notion of consent?  The 
Kennedy family aside, Catholicism does not permit the remarriage of 
divorced persons; what does a liberal democracy say about that?  
Islamic law permits the stoning of adulterous wives.  Surely a liberal 
democracy has something to say about ceding authority over family 
matters to Sharia law, as the government of Ontario did in stepping back 
from that particular brink in September, 2005.43 
Without using the vocabulary of multi-culturalism, Professor 
Crane’s privatization endorses a multi-cultural regime for marriage.  
Each couple (or each plurality in the case of polygamous religions) 
chooses and then is bound by the religious traditions to which they feel 
most closely tied.  From the perspective of cultural accommodation, this 
is good.  The authority of the group is recognized; its autonomy 
strengthened.  But such accommodation is also likely to work against 
less powerful members within the group, those who Les Green has 
called minorities within minorities.44  As Green observes, “without 
respect for internal minorities, a liberal society risks becoming a mosaic 
of tyrannies.”45  This may be particularly true in the area of family law 
where as Shachar has noted, “the violation of rights are systemic rather 
than accidental.”46 
Extending religious control over marriage through religious 
privatization also works hand in hand with the trend toward economic 
privatization.  While the phrase might once have referred simply to the 
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notion that the market is the best mechanism for resource allocation, 
privatization now encompasses a broader restructuring of the relation 
between the polity and state.  It frequently stands for the proposition 
that responsibility for individual welfare is less a matter of public 
obligation than a private concern.47  But reassigning responsibility to the 
private sphere almost always increases the burden on women, the 
traditional care-takers, and this in turn heightens their vulnerability in 
all spheres of life. 
 For all these reasons, it is therefore not enough simply to invoke 
minimum norms to satisfy concerns about unjust practices in religious 
marriage.  Religions are markedly undemocratic, concerned not with 
rights or equality or principles of non-discrimination but with the 
demands of faith.  Moreover, I suspect few religions would accept the 
importation of democratic norms, minimal or not, as a condition of 
governance.  It means nothing to cede authority to religious tradition if 
the religion must first sign on to an incompatible set of civic values and 
practices. 
One final point.  Professor Crane suggests that civil marriage and 
the behaviors it tolerates have had a dispiriting trickle-down effect on 
religious marriage.48  I am less concerned that secular values are 
infiltrating religious institutions than that the influence is working in 
exactly the opposite direction.  We now live in an era that many 
politicians, some clergy, and all Fox news commentators call the 
“Culture of Life.”49  This is a belief system organized around the 
proposition that life starts at conception and ends at Teri Schiavo (with 
something of a detour around the death penalty).  The Culture of Life 
may sound secular enough but it is in fact saturated with meaning and 
beliefs from within the Christian tradition.50  The Culture of Life has 
become a significant piece of American political rhetoric.  More 
importantly, however, as the special Culture of Life section on the 
White House Website makes very clear, its core values have been 
aggressively incorporated into laws and policies ranging from 
restrictions on stem cell research to the Born Alive Infants Protection 
Act.51  At a moment in which our political institutions are becoming 
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increasingly and unabashedly religious in tone and in content, I am 
specially loathe to return marriage to the churches, however authentic 




I recognize that civil marriage has been and remains problematic as 
the authoritative structure for family and relationships.  This is true not 
only as a matter of law and policy but, as most married folk 
acknowledge now and then, as a matter of daily interaction.  As Phyllis 
Rose has observed, it is “[b]ad enough to choose once in a lifetime 
whom to live with; to go on choosing, to reaffirm one’s choice day after 
day, as one must when it is culturally possible to divorce, is really 
asking a lot of people.”52 
However, I think it is worth letting all committed couples ask this 
of one another: to commit to the full extent that is possible at law.  And 
it is marriage law—not contract law—that ought to do the heavy lifting 
here, not as a functional matter—we can probably kick contract law into 
sufficient shape to do the job if necessary—but as a matter of the 
legitimacy of state authority over marriage.  Just as the state has 
interests in marriage, citizens have an interest in the state articulating 
and defending its interests, as it was eventually unable to do with 
miscegenation, prohibitions on contraception, or as an absolute 
requirement for parenting.53  The nature of the state’s interest in 
marriage is often contested, as it should be.  As historian Nancy Cott 
has pointed out, “[t]he public benefit of governmental involvement in 
marriage no longer goes without saying.”54  But the explication of the 
state’s interest is less likely to be produced by adjusting the definition of 
consideration or narrowing the application of injunctive relief. 
I recognize and lament the fact that gay couples in the lower forty-
nine states are not permitted to marry now.  But they and their allies can 
at least appeal to democratic processes rather than to the Restatement 
Second or, more problematically, to the Vatican.  Contestation over the 
legal regulation of intimate relations may be just the kind of issue we 
should leave on the table for its slow resolution, resorting neither to 
contract nor religion, especially when both are already available to those 
who prefer to leave the state out. 
 
 
 52 PHYLLIS ROSE, PARALLEL LIVES: FIVE VICTORIAN MARRIAGES 18 (1983). 
 53 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 54 Nancy Cott, The Public Stake, in JUST MARRIAGE 33, 36 (2004). 
